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In March, 1943, an unmarried girl, 17 years of age, knowing that
she was about to become a mother signed an agreerient and consent
to the child's adoption. One day after the birth of her child, she
signed an acknowledgment of the consent. The chid was born on
May 5, 1943. Four days later, on May 9, 1943, the child was given
to the adoptive parents. On May 10, 1943, the adoptive parents filed
a petition for adoption. On July 3, 1943, petition was filed by the
next friend of the natural mother asking the court 1;o pass an order
withdrawing the consent to the adoption. The district court held that
the natural mother, as a matter of law, has the right to withdraw
her consent without cause, before the final order of adoption. Upon
appeal, the circuit court of appeals reversed and renAnded the order,
holding that "the natural mother, as a matter of law, does not have
the right to withdraw her consent without cause." In. re Adoption of
of a Minor, 144 F. (2d) 644. (1944).
Adoption was not recognized at common law; but certain rights
and duties accompanying the parent-child relationship" were enforced
by the courts even in view of agreements to the contrary.2 Later sta-
tutes recognized the legal status of adoption. Thu3, statutes alone
determine when the relation of parent and child ceases and in what
respects it shall do so.3 Statutes relating to adoption4 have been uni-
formly held to be constitutional except when the statutes interfere with
vested rights of the parents. 5 Courts in determining adoption cases
have said that the interests of parent and child are controlling. Under
diverse statutes, an adoption based upon a consent that has been with-
drawn has been held void,6 that a parent's consent may be withdrawn
at any time before final order of adoption7, even though the consent
was in writings, and accompanied by transfer of the child9. Courts have
protected parental rights even when the natural parent has abandoned
the child.' 0 However, where the interests of the child would require
1. Madden, Domestic Relations (1931) §§ 120-142.
2. Madden, Domestic Relations (1931) § 106.
3. State ex rel Van Cleve v. Froter,--Wash-, 150 P. (2d) 391 (1943);
In re Ziegler, 82 Misc. 346 (Surr. Ct. 1913), 143 N.Y.S. 562 (1913);
aff'd 161 App. Div. 589 (Surr. Ct. 1914), 146 NoY.S. 881 (1914).
4. 4 Vernier, American Family Laws (1936) 254-64.
5. In re Frost's Will, 182 N.Y.S. 559 (1920); aff'd 192 App. Div. 206
(1st ep't 1920); In re Hoods Estate, 206 Wis. 227, 239 N.W. 488
(1931); Sewall v. Roberts, 115 Mass, 262 (1874).
6. In re Nelms, 153 Wash. 242, 279 Pac. 748 (1929).
7. In re Andrews, 189 Minn. 85, 284 N.W. 657 (1933); In re Sunada,
31 Hawaii 328 (1930).
8. State v. Berdsley, 149 Minn. 35, 183 N.W. 956 (1921).
9. Hebhardt v. Anderson, 7 Pa. D.&C. 139 (1926).
10. Andrew's Adoption, 14 Pa. D.&C. 343 (1930).
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it", statutes have deprived parents, without the parents' consent, of
a child under certain circumstances 12. Hence, in the past, emphasis has
been placed upon the individual interests of the parents and the in-
terests of the child.
The circuit court of appeals found that the District of Columbia
Code'13 adopted a new and different public policy toward adoption, i.e.,
a change in emphasis from the parental interests to the social interests
involved' 4---weight being given to the interests of the child in both
cases. Thus, "The individual interests of parents which used to be
the thing chiefly regarded has come to be almost the last thing re-
garded as compared with the interest of society and of the child."'15
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
The Original Package Doctrine
A manufacturer contracted to purchase raw materials from foreign
and Filipino suppliers through the latter's American agents. The
merchandise was identified with and appropriated to the purchase
contract from the moment of shipment., The merchandise was con-
signed to brokers and bankers, part on order, part on straight bills
of lading, with instructions to notify the manufacturer; 2 it was cleared
through customs in the consignee's name and then reconsigned to the
manufacturer. While stored in original packages in a warehouse at
the purchaser's factory pending use in the manufacturing process,
11. James v. Williams, 169 Tenn. 41, 82 S.W. (2d) 541 (1935); In re
Clough, 28 Ariz. 204, 236 Pac. 700 (1925).
12. Abandonment. Adoption of McGill, 49 Pa. D.&C. 374 (1943); Peti-
tion of Elkendahl, 321 Ill. App. 457, 53 N.E. (2d) 302 (1943);
Purinton v. Jamrock, 195 Mass. 187, 80 N.E. 802 (1907). Drunk-
enness. Stearns v. Allen, 183 Mass. 404, 67 N.E. 349 (1903).
13. D.C. Code, (1940) tit. 16, c.II, §§16-201 to 16-207.
14. In its reasoning as to the legislative policy the court stated,
"(***It goes without saying that such people (illegitimate) are
more apt to become a burden upon organized society than cooperat-
ing members of it.' Mangold, "Children Born out of Wedlock" (1921)
131." p. 651 n. "'The number of children who are housed in asy-
lums or boarded out at the expense of the public is evidence enough
of the problem and of the need.' Information supplied by the Board
of Public Welfare of the District of Columbia." p. 650. "It was
with all these considerations in mind that congress repealed the old
statute and enacted a new one for the District of Columbia***."
6. 650.
15. Pound, "The Spirit of the Common Law' (1921) 189.
1. Ground given in distinguishing Waring v. City of Mobile, 8 Wall.
122 (U.S. 1868) (consignee held to be the importer). See prin-
cipal case at 876 n. 4.
2. 46 Stat. 721 (1930), 19 U.S.C.A. § 1483 (1) (1934) provides that
merchandise imported into the United States "shall be held to be the
property of the person to whom the same is consigned." The
court did "not deem this provision to be significant." Principal
case, at 876 n. 3. " . . . the Constitution gives Congress au-
thority . . . to lay down its own test for determining when the
immunity ends." Id. at 878. The Board of Tax Appeals considered
the provision. Hooven & Allison Co. v. Evatt, 26 Ohio 0. 25 (1943).
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